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J

ustice anthony kennedy’s majority opinion in Roper v.
Simmons,1 which endorsed the use of foreign and international
law in U.S. constitutional adjudication, has at least the virtue of
putting everyone’s cards on the table. Until that decision was
handed down (on March 1, 2005), it remained possible to view
the appearance of foreign law in constitutional decisions as nothing more
than a minor hobbyhorse for Justice Stephen Breyer or Justice Kennedy — a
merely rhetorical nod in the direction of the mostly Western European
judges with whom they have become friends at international judicial conferences and other such venues over the years.
As for Justice Antonin Scalia’s attacks on the use of foreign legal materials, well, they were withering and witty, as always, but surely a bit over the
top? Judges, after all — even Justice Scalia — have been adorning their opinions with bits of poetry, Shakespeare, and the Bible for a very long time, so

Kenneth Anderson is professor of law at the Washington College of Law,
American University, and a research fellow at the Hoover Institution,
Stanford University. Email: kanders@wcl.american.edu. Website:
http://kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com.
June & July 2005

33

Policy Review

Kenneth Anderson
why not the occasional reference to opinions of the Supreme Court of
Zimbabwe or the Privy Council or the European Court of Human Rights?
What could possibly be the harm in it?
Justice Kennedy’s Roper majority opinion puts paid to the conceit that
this is all just a bit of fluff exaggerated into something sinister and conspiratorial by Federalist Society right-wing ideologues. Roper asserts far more, it
turns out, than the prior use of foreign law in contemporary constitutional
cases would have suggested.2 It blesses in the contemporary era a new doctrine of constitutional adjudication, what has been called “constitutional
comparativism,” that is very far indeed from mere flirtation. It invites the
deployment of a sweeping body of legal materials from outside U.S. domestic law into the process of interpreting the U.S. Constitution — and, moreover, invites it into American society’s most difficult and contentious “values” questions.
The Roper opinion reassuringly holds that the “task of interpreting the
Eighth Amendment [cruel and unusual punishment] remains our responsibility.” It adds, however, that it does not “lessen our fidelity to the Constitution
. . . to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental
rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the centrality of
those same rights within our heritage of freedom.” Roper then proceeds to
deploy a startling range of international authorities that hitherto would have
been thought not only irrelevant but affirmatively barred from U.S. constitutional adjudication. That the opinion overlays the groundwork for a globalizing Court with a series of pat phrases transparently aimed at soothing
parochial American sensibilities — reassuring the populace that the
Constitution remains “theirs” — does not lessen in the least the enormity of
what the Court has done.

“International” or “universal”

R

oper cites, for example, the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child. Indeed, the Court even notes in passing
what might have been thought a fatal flaw, viz., that the United
States has not ratified it. The Court prefers to treat this unratified convention as evidence of global — in the sense of universal — views on juvenile
1Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (March 1, 2005).

.

2It is important to be clear that the controversy about foreign case law is specifically about the interpreta-

tion of the U.S. Constitution. All hands, including Justice Scalia, would readily acknowledge that the
interpretation of statutes, conventions, international agreements, and so on frequently requires recourse
to foreign and international law. U.S. statutes, for example, are often drafted with foreign and international law in mind. Moreover, the international law at issue is not that to which the United States has
assented by ratifying a treaty, or customary international law acknowledged as such by the United States,
but instead unratified international conventions and assertions of customary international law which the
United States does not accept as custom. When this article refers to foreign law and international legal
materials, this specific meaning is intended.
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capital punishment to which the United States should, and the Court will
ensure that it does, pay heed.
Such citation is problematic on a number of fronts. It is, moreover,
emblematic of the several conceptual difficulties with the use of either foreign law or international law to which the United States has not assented
and given an understanding of the nature and scope of its formal legal
undertaking.3 The Court’s unstated assumption, for example, that the
Children’s Rights Convention’s near-universal ratification means that it is
actually accepted on its own terms by the world is simply false. Even at the
formal legal level, the Court ignores how widely the Convention features
sweeping reservations by individual countries: Saudi Arabia, for example, as
with so many Muslim countries, has ratified, but with a formal reservation
(surely not irrelevant to the Court’s inquiry) that none of it has any application to the extent that it conflicts with shari’ah law.
As for compliance in fact — widespread adherence of the sort that would
meaningfully reflect a consensus of opinion around the world — at generous
best, we may say the Convention is essentially hortatory and honored in the
breach by the nations of the world.4 The Court is interested, of course, in
one tiny part of the Convention, but the evidence proffered by the Court for
its supposed universality obtains only in virtue of the Convention as a whole
text, viz., the extent of the whole text’s ratification. Widespread lack of compliance with large parts of the treaty undermines, therefore, the claim that it
— or the specific rule concerning juvenile execution contained in it — is universal in the way that the Court asserts. The devil is in the details, in other
words, and it is such empirical and formal legal details that elude the Court
— or, more precisely, details which the Court elides in its scrubbing up of
foreign and international law sources for the purposes for which it has preordained them.
A certain sleight-of-hand is involved in much discussion of the “universal” values the Court has grown fond of citing in the abstract. An unstated,
unargued-for assumption in much of this rhetoric is that “global” and
“international” are the same as “universal.” It presumes, in other words,
that if one’s position can be described as “global” or “international” or
3Starting with the issue of whether the international agreement in question even permits private claims by
individuals to be heard with respect to it in federal court.
4The only two states that have not ratified are the United States and Somalia. The Convention is a pastiche of reasonably sensible provisions governing matters of obvious transborder significance, such as
trafficking in children, on the one hand, and many more which aspire to regulate, as a matter of international law, the most intimate relations between parents and children by inserting the state between them,
on the other. The treaty as a whole reflects a profoundly anti-parent, pro-state view of child-raising and
has been widely criticized and, indeed, ridiculed for its many bizarre provisions. These include (among
many examples) that the state shall use the “protection of the law” (as against parents) to ensure that “no
child shall be subjected to arbitrary . . . interference with his or her privacy . . . or correspondence.”
International law prohibiting arbitrary parental interference in a child’s letter-writing? This is the international agreement from which the Court draws, which such sententiousness, evidence of universal opinion
regarding the juvenile death penalty? At the least, a Court honest about its deployment of sources would
have found it necessary to square the Convention’s supposedly universal views on juvenile capital punishment with its views on juvenile letter-writing.
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“transnational” because it transcends mere geography and mere borders, it
is “universal” in the moral sense of applicable to all, free of particular interests, free of prejudice and attachments, impartial and disinterested and hence
suitable to judge as between others’ particular interests.
But why assume that the views of those who live globally, internationally,
or transnationally are indeed morally universal? Why assume that they have
no particular interests and no partiality? Do they not have the particular,
parochial, partial interests of elites who spiritually reside in the interstices
among New York and London and Paris — and those, we might add, who
judge in Washington but fete in Strasbourg? Is it not a category mistake at
best and deliberate intellectual manipulation to the ends of power at worst?
Why are universal values not equally well discovered by democratic majorities in particular societies, with all their openly acknowledged interests and
partialities, as by transgeographic elites who refuse to acknowledge the fact
that they, too, have interests and partiality, and indeed their own topology,
by appealing to the authority of moral universalism? It is not hard to guess
what Kant, who never went anywhere to speak of, would have thought of
the conflation of “global” and “universal.”
The Roper opinion further cites article 6 ( 5 ) of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr), which prohibits juvenile
capital punishment. Merely in passing, however, does the Court trouble itself
to note that the United States ratified the iccpr with an express reservation
concerning article 6(5). But perhaps most remarkable in this most remarkable opinion is that the Court nowhere cites a treaty or convention which
the United States actually has ratified, assented to, and drawn into its
domestic law without relevant reservation. Rather, it has chosen to cite
treaties that the United States has quite deliberately refused to join or has
joined only with reservations on the very point at issue. So much for the paradigmatic constitutional doctrine that binding the United States by treaty in
the community of nations is a function belonging to the political branches of
government. Indeed, the Court seems functionally to have treated all these
unratified treaties and other materials as though its task were to pronounce
on the content of customary international law (international law unwritten
in treaties and yet considered binding on all states) and then require its
application in the United States. The Court nowhere calls it customary law
— because, one hopes the Court understands, it is not — but the process of
reasoning toward a supposed consensus on the law’s content feels (at least to
this international lawyer) very much like it — provided one accepts, that is,
a very contemporary, very expansive, and frankly dubious view of how customary law is discerned.
The Roper doctrine is thus the more startling because it is not principally
about drawing foreign or international law as such into U.S. constitutional
adjudication. It is not even about law as law. Instead, it is about drawing
from such legal materials evidence as to foreign or international public opinion — more precisely, evidence about elite opinion in other parts of the
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world, especially Western European elites whose views are more than likely
to coincide with the Roper majority’s own. Roper gathers up this body of
foreign elite opinion, acknowledges it as opinion about values (rather than
law as such), and blesses it as a source of decision-making by the Court. It is
not (yet) binding precedent, to be sure, because it is not law as such, but it is
not irrelevant either; nothing that a court need follow, because it is not law
as such, but something a court, on no determinate basis, may choose to take
into account. As Justice Scalia observes in dissent, the heart of the Roper
doctrine is that “though the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, the views of other countries and the socalled international community take center stage.”

“A decent respect”

J

ustice kennedy is not Justice Scalia’s intellectual peer, and it is
hard to extract much of a guiding theory — in the sense of knowing
when such legal materials may be used and when they may not —
from Justice Kennedy’s unedifying admixture of piety, vacuity, earnestness,
idealism, and platitude. Yet this is no mere trope of Justice Kennedy’s. Fully
six justices signed onto the Roper doctrine, including Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, who dissented from the dissenters specifically in order to approve
the majority’s use of foreign and international legal materials. However
vaguely delimited in Roper, it is a doctrine with solid support on today’s
Court. What, then, of its justification (or not) as a constitutional doctrine?
Justification is, of course, a matter of legal and political theory: the question of how the use of these foreign and international legal materials can be
squared, if at all, with broadly accepted theories of law and politics that purport to legitimize and justify the legal and political order. The “justification”
inquiry has at least three relevant levels: philosophies of judging and the
rhetoric of judging, constitutional interpretation, and the political theory of
sovereignty. Of the three, most of the attention thus far has gone to the first,
the question of squaring the practice with philosophies of judging, although
attention is gradually shifting to the other two.
Prior to Roper, the principal decisional materials from which to form an
idea of the current Court’s view of foreign law in constitutional adjudication
were a relatively small handful of cases, in which various foreign cases were
cited.5 Several were capital punishment cases (although the most famous
instance of foreign case citation was found in Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, which invalidated state laws against homosexual conduct).6 Occasionally, justices — including O’Connor, Breyer, Ruth
5For example, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); and

Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002).
6Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Bader Ginsburg, and Kennedy — have made favorable reference to the practice in public appearances, but often these were speeches before such bodies
as the American Society of International Law, where a certain bowing to
organizational and advocacy agendas would be expected but regarded as
largely hortatory and not seriously jurisprudential.
None of these venues — cases or speeches — provides very much illumination on the practice itself, its legal justification, history, permissible extent,
or limitations. Justice Breyer seemed to think it sufficient merely to remark,
in his review of foreign court cases in Knight v. Florida (a capital punishment case), that the “willingness to consider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a
‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind’.”7
We might ask whether this is so obvious. The reference to the Declaration
of Independence’s famous phrase is itself curious. Although the phrase has
morphed into a cliché, offered in any and all circumstances in support of
expansive views of the place of international law in U.S. law, its actual
provenance is more limited. Jefferson was referring, after all, not to justification of the practices of a settled constitutional order of several centuries, but
instead to a society that was about to undertake revolution, rebellion, sedition, treason, confiscation, secession, and war against its lawful sovereign.
The moment indeed warranted an explanation for why all that was justified,
in terms that the rest of mankind might understand. Nine generations later,
Justice Breyer might more accurately have said that consideration of the
opinions of mankind was appropriate at, not from, the moment of the
nation’s birth.

More than mere“information”

J

ustice breyer’s and his court colleagues’ other opinions
embracing the practice are similarly opaque as to justification.
However, in January 2005 — not long before Roper was issued —
Justices Breyer and Scalia held a “public conversation” at the Washington
College of Law, American University, on exactly the question of the use of
foreign law in U.S. constitutional adjudication.8 One noteworthy aspect of
the exchange was that both justices treated the essential question as being,

7Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (mem.), at 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
8The event on January 13, 2005, moderated by Professor Norman Dorsen of New York University
School of Law, was cosponsored by the U.S. Association of Constitutional Law, a scholarly comparative
law society of which I am a board member. A full written transcript of the event can be found at the
Washington College of Law website, www.wcl.american.edu. The discussion was informal and unscripted, and as such must not be unfairly overinterpreted by putting excessive weight upon extemporaneous,
spoken turns of phrase. For that reason, I have here avoided quoting the justices directly and have instead
paraphrased. Nonetheless, the event gave a remarkable window into the thinking of the two justices on
this question.
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first and foremost, the philosophy of judging — how to define and delimit
the rhetoric of judging, in terms of sources, language, plasticity and permeability, rigidity and impenetrability. Some of these rhetorical issues meld into
questions of constitutional interpretation, but even so, the focus was on the
rhetorical task of what judges actually do. Neither justice showed any significant interest in raising the debate to the level of political theory and sovereignty.
Accordingly, rather than attacking the practice as inconsistent with the
democratic sovereignty of the people of the United States, Justice Scalia criticized the practice for opening up the rhetoric of judging to a new kind of
language, a vast body of sources that could, in his view, only lend themselves
to allowing a judge to go wherever he or she wanted to go. He was very
careful to make this criticism not only from the standpoint of his judicial
philosophy of originalism — which would, by its nature, rule out nearly all
foreign law but the special, historical English law relevant to the
Constitution’s founding — but also from the standpoint of a non-originalist.
Even if you were not an originalist, he argued, even if you believed in an
“evolving” or “living” Constitution, you still should be concerned about the
unconstrained nature of the materials brought into play and the possibilities
for unconstrained results. Adherents of the evolving Constitution, after all,
generally want to see it as going somewhere — toward a substantive vision
of progress, not simply wherever jurists will take it. And the effect of these
materials is to de-constrain judges in their rhetoric and, eventually, in their
judging. Judicial rhetoric matters.
Justice Breyer’s response was, really, surprise that anyone should make a
big deal out of this. Foreign case law is information like any other; judges
take it in, and it informs them in the same way that reading books or attending academic lectures or anything else might. Judges, after all, read law
review articles in order to be expert in their field, and yet, as Justice Breyer
observed, no one elected the professors who wrote them. It would be downright perverse to say, no, judges should not be aware of any of the stuff that
their counterparts do on similar issues in other countries. Who wants to say
that ignorance is the best policy, for fear of — well, what? Contamination?
Surely one does not want to tell a judge to increase his or her ignorance of
how things are done in other places. And if that position is rejected as
absurd, then it would be disingenuous for a judge not to acknowledge the
source of his or her knowledge, even if it just happened to be an opinion in a
case from the constitutional court of some other country. What in any of
this is remotely objectionable?
Commentators have reinforced Justice Breyer’s “no big deal” view with
observations on how frequently the Supreme Court in the past has made reference to foreign law and international legal materials in constitutional adjudication — including some of the leading “values” cases; these include perhaps the lowest ebb of Court jurisprudence, the infamous Dred Scott slavery
case, as well as Reynolds (upholding the outlawing of polygamy among
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nineteenth-century Mormons). It might even be said, surveying the history of
the Court’s holdings, that controversial values cases seem affirmatively to
attract citation of non-U.S. authorities because the Court sought rhetorical
justification in what seemed at the time to be incontrovertible human truths
present in all the world, or at least what the Court recognized as the civilized
world.
It is not so clear what these historical arguments contribute to Justice
Breyer’s position. British law occupies a very special place with respect to the
transition from the Colonies to the United States; there is no historically
comparable body of law from any other source over which one could conceivably have the same argument. Put another way, in both citing early
English law and objecting to the citation of other foreign law, Justice Scalia
is not at all inconsistent. Moreover, the terms “international law” and “law
of nations,” and the range of subjects they cover, have shifted in sense so
enormously over two centuries that it does not seem to mean much to say
that the Court has long cited international law. One would have to show
that the Court historically cited international law of a kind, say, purporting
to cover such contemporary human rights concepts as a child’s supposed
right to keep his letter-writing private from his parents, and not merely international law as respecting prize courts.
More compelling is what we might call Justice Breyer’s “anti-ignorance,”
“information” argument. If one takes his remarks at American University
together with comments made in several speeches by other justices, one
detects a certain bemusement, perhaps even concern and a touch of alarm,
at the idea that a judge (especially in response to popular agitation) should
be confined in his or her learning, reading, thinking, and acquisition of
knowledge for fear of applying something that ought not to figure in a case.
Hence Justice Breyer refers to “common” legal problems in which one jurisdiction might learn from another.
Yet this is too anodyne. Certain legal problems are “common” because
they raise cross-border issues, such as settlement of water disputes or pollution between countries. One might also talk of “common” legal problems
where the judiciary of one country might learn from the experience of
another country’s courts and their special techniques. France, for example,
recently introduced a class action device, and it obviously and intelligently
looked to comparative models.
Yet the most visible of the “common” legal problems Justice Breyer has
in mind are very different. He seems to have in mind, at least to judge by
the cases in which he has raised them, grand “values” questions. Capital
punishment is evidently a concern, but there is no reason why the same
concern should not apply to abortion, affirmative action, homosexual
conduct, hate speech, religious accommodation, and so on. To be sure,
other societies and other countries face at least some of these issues and
work their way toward resolution. And of course one can acquire information about how they have dealt with those issues. But what, exactly,
40
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has one acquired information about?
It is all very well to say that information is good, more information is better, and judges should be informed and should acknowledge the sources of
their information. But what is the information that Justice Breyer says is
acquired in this process? The fact that other countries have values issues in
their legal and political systems and that sometimes they resolve them one
way and sometimes another?
This is “information,” yes. It is a fact, a datum, a bit of knowledge. But,
frankly, so what? Knowing that other legal systems also express values,
sometimes similar to and sometimes different from ours, does not seem to
contribute very much to adjudication. Indeed, it has the suspicious sense of
inviting us to confuse — really, to cover — an “ought” with an “is” — the
“is” of informing us as to how, apparently as a merely factual matter, another legal system does things. But this can mean something as a matter of judging only if you say one of two additional things: either that we are compelled, as a matter of precedent, to replace our “ought” with their “ought”
or, alternatively, that we ought to replace our “ought” with their “ought.”
The first of these alternatives is ruled out, thus far, by the Roper opinion,
and the second requires some additional value of our own, which cannot be
acquired merely by knowing what is done in some legal system somewhere
else.
There is a third, much more radical possibility, of course. This is to look
directly at the values underlying the reasons another legal system does things
a different way (abolishing the death penalty, for example — or prohibiting
abortion on the grounds that it is murder, to take an equally good example),
not in order to understand it as “information” — facts and data — but
instead simply to see, apperceiving, that their value is right and ours is
wrong. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the determination of other
people — other places, other legal systems, other sovereign orders — that it
is deeply and grotesquely wrong to impose a penalty of death speaks deeply
to the urbane, cosmopolitan, civilized Justice Breyer. And it supplies the
missing “values” predicate without which his “information” from other
legal systems means nothing. Yet proceeding judicially on the basis of what
amounts not to sense but to sensibility — not yet revealed, however, to the
people through their legislatures — raises profoundly difficult issues of
democracy and sovereignty.

Four theories

C

onstitutional comparativism, conceived merely as a means
of rationally acquiring information in the way Justice Breyer has
defended it — but really as something more passionately normative
— would seem to carry severe difficulties for delineating the proper rhetorical function of a judge. At a minimum, it is insufficient to pass it off merely
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as what judges do in their quotidian work or to say surely one cannot mean
for judges to be affirmatively ignorant of the world around them. The
process Justice Breyer defends would be better described as training judges’
private sensibilities than as informing them of facts; but private sensibility in
a functioning democracy is not fundamentally in the hands of judges to
enforce (and despite the fact that a certain kind of private sensibility, as a
matter of temperament, is also important in a judge). Put another way, seeing Justice Breyer’s project of acquiring information as the education of sensibility sets up Justice Scalia’s charge that the deployment of foreign and
international legal materials in constitutional adjudication swings wide the
door for the exercise of judges’ purely private sensibilities asserted as public
justice. It is, on this view, unconstrained and unconstrainable. And to that,
the least convincing response put forth by Justice Breyer at the American
University colloquium was to say merely that judges, if properly doing their
jobs, would have the good sense to know when and to what extent it is
appropriate to utilize such material, and in what matters. The merely ad hoc
is not sufficient to effect a rescue.
Justice Scalia’s critique is partly a matter of the philosophy and rhetoric of
judging, but it also shades into the second issue in the justification of this
practice: theories of legal and specifically constitutional interpretation. The
appropriate level of constraint upon the private predilections of judges is,
after all, a key element in any theory of legal interpretation, constitutional
interpretation perhaps most of all. How does the use of foreign or international legal materials — constitutional comparativism — comport with leading contemporary theories of constitutional adjudication?9
The four leading theories today are originalism, natural law, majoritarianism, and pragmatism. None of these, points out Roger Alford, really gets
those currently most enthusiastic about the practice — progressivist liberals
of an internationalist and elitist bent — where they want to go with respect
to substantive constitutional outcomes.
Originalism is plainly incompatible with the broad use of foreign and
international legal materials because, as a theory historically grounded in a
particular document as written by particular people at a particular time, it
looks not at all at how other peoples in other countries today do things. Still
less relevant to it is any sense of world public opinion, the opinion of the
“international community,” and so on.
Natural law, Alford observes, is “perhaps the most coherent rationale for
recognizing the validity of comparative analysis in constitutional adjudication.” Its appeals to “universalism and fundamentality” — language which
figures, for example, in Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Roper — are “often
grounded in this theory. To contend that a right is inalienable or naturally
endowed invites reference to comparative experiences to buttress or betray
9I draw here extensively on an important recent article, Roger P. Alford, “In Search of a Theory for
Constitutional Comparativism,” UCLA Law Review 52 (February 2005).
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the universal appeal of the asserted right.” Yet natural law is haunted by two
“great ghosts” — indeterminacy and judicial hegemony — and has been
largely discredited in contemporary jurisprudence as a theory of constitutional interpretation, as distinguished from a moral theory (although Alford
traces its survival through modern cases, including Lawrence).
Majoritarianism has two strands: a conservative version that seeks to
limit the counter-majoritarian role of the Constitution and an activist version that seeks to “embody in the text of the Constitution current contemporary standards.” Either version, however, is reflective of national democratic
sovereignty, as the touchstone is when the majority should prevail and when
it should not. Both versions firmly locate the discussion within the political
community of the United States. In neither case is
The process
there much to be gained from comparativism.
Of the live theories of constitutional interpretaJustice Breyer
tion, pragmatism offers the best fit with comparative
constitutionalism. Essentially a rough and ready ver- defends could
sion of consequentialism, vaguely rooted in William
James and Oliver Wendell Holmes (“the life of the
be described
law has not been logic: it has been experience”), and
as training
with an emphasis on empiricism and experience, it
has been defined by a leading adherent as a “dispojudges’ private
sition to ground policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms and genersensibilities.
alities.”10 One of those empirical facts is globalization, and the most pronounced pragmatist justice on the Court, Justice
Breyer, has thoroughly embraced the proposition that constitutional doctrine
must, as Alford describes it, take account of “not just . . . our national experience, but also . . . global realities. Breyer’s pragmatism has boldly invigorated transnational empiricism as a constitutional method.”
I have already suggested that Breyer’s apparent empiricism may conceal a
host of ideological and moral premises that pragmatism, as an interpretive
philosophy, may be inclined to deny. This is consistent with the fact that
some leading pragmatists — Judge Richard Posner, for example — believe
that it has gone beyond the conceptual limitations of conventional moral
philosophy and is likewise beyond ideology — just the facts, ma’am.11 The
moral philosophers, unsurprisingly, do not agree. Nor do I; pragmatism
seems to me riddled with values masquerading as facts. Nonetheless, as ideology, judicial pragmatism, coupled with a strong, highly particularized
interpretation of the facts of globalization — viz., the view that globalization
is destined to overcome borders, sovereignty, and the nation-state — naturally leads one to comparative constitutionalism. Thus, it is no surprise that
10Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2003), 76, 85........
11

See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law (Harvard University Press, 1995).
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in Justice Breyer’s opinion writing, outside the constitutional arena as well as
within, foreign law figures prominently.

Three cautions

T

he marriage of pragmatism and comparative constitutionalism
may be a happy one for the couple, but enthusiasts of foreign law
in constitutional cases might consider three cautions.
The first is that the marriage depends less on pragmatism than on a view
about globalization. Judge Posner, for example (today’s Ur-pragmatist), has
expressed great caution about the enterprise and categorically rejects the
central notion of Justice Breyer’s comparativism, that the world is or is
growing to be a unitary legal community. To cite “foreign law as authority,”
Posner says, “is to . . . suppose fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single, elite community of wisdom and conscience.”12 Justice Breyer,
on the contrary, seems to believe that this and a great many other things
about globalization are genuinely facts about the world. They appear to me,
as to other skeptics, rather as articles of faith in a new world order, and one
which the good judge is diligently (and, in fairness, in good faith) seeking to
bring about — an elite participant in an enterprise as deeply ideological as
any in politics or law. It is very easy to imagine a future historian of the
Court writing of Justice Breyer not as the calmly dispassionate empiricist of
globalization, but instead as the calmly dispassionate ideologue of a highly
particular view of globalization and as purveyor of the agenda of a globalized Court to the Court itself.
The second caution goes directly to the agenda of those hoping to use
comparative constitutionalism as a way of advancing a politically progressive agenda otherwise blocked by democratic majoritarianism. Much of the
U.S. civil liberties tradition is an unabashed outlier with respect to the rest of
the world — the Miranda warning and the exclusionary rule, Roe, and
many other protections far less obvious. There is nothing in pragmatism that
promises a particular vision of political progress, and, indeed, there is little if
anything in pragmatism that argues for liberty or equality as such. Alford
correctly says that pragmatism is
hardly capable of sustaining the full freight of the comparativist agenda.
Pragmatic decisions that enhance civil liberties are rare, and they frequently offer a rationale for curtailing rather than advancing constitutional rights. . . . Devoid of a summum bonum, pragmatism is not prescriptive to the degree that most comparativists would like it to be.

As liberals in recent years have grown tired of certain civil liberties — free
.
12See Richard A. Posner, “No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws,” Legal Affairs (July–August
2004).
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speech, in particular, as it has proved to be useful in the hands of conservatives — the fact that pragmatism has little or no inclination to plow new
grounds of principle may mean little to them. Likewise, they may not care
that foreign law is frequently much less libertarian than American law if
their fundamental substantive agenda is not liberty — save for abortion —
but instead equality, interpreted as social democracy. One can spend much
time drawing out of foreign and international legal materials a substantive
economic agenda of social democracy.
Yet there is still a vast terrain of specifically American jurisprudence constraining the power of the state that progressivism might come to regret losing — battles over national identity cards, for example, or many elements of
the Patriot Act(s) in which governmental power can be only too easily
defended on the basis of Western European comparisons. Yet this is emphatically not merely a matter of “conservative” versus “liberal.” Alford carefully examines the use of comparative constitutionalism not only in the great
“values” issues, but in narrower constitutional matters such as law enforcement interrogation, working hours restrictions, and voting practices. He
concludes that when
comparative pragmatism is used in constitutional jurisprudence, it often
is for the benefit of the government seeking to limit a right rather than
the individual asserting the right. Pragmatic decisionmaking, with its
focus on real-world consequences, may be used by the state to justify
curtailments of a purported constitutional right. . . . Although the Court
has suggested that comparative experiences may enhance individual
rights, transnational empiricism has actually been invoked to curtail
individual liberties and uphold the propriety of government action.

Third, as a judicial philosophy, pragmatism recognizes no principle that
constrains what it undertakes and where it goes; it has, in Alford’s phrase,
no “unshakeable priors.” Law simply is policy, a consequentialist calculus,
and constraints are not deontological principles, but ultimately rules of
thumb (even if very strong ones in the hands of a pragmatist like Judge
Posner). This lack in principle of judicial constraint might not now bother
political progressives, hoping as ever that the judiciary will give them the victories denied them by voters, but they may come to regret it. Foreign law,
unless checked in some way, will be in the hands of conservative as well as
liberal judges, and the ability to pick and choose from all the jurisdictions of
the world, frequently much more statist in their jurisprudence than the U.S.
— and this is true of “civilized” and “progressive” Western Europe — operates as a rhetorical “force multiplier” for a judge looking to buttress some
position, any position, conservative or liberal. There is simply so much of it,
and it is notably free of informal rules about “weight” or “predominant
view” that obtain within any particular judicial system.
More abstractly, this foreign legal material is absorbed into the judging
process as pure text, free of the “embeddedness” within our judicial system
June & July 2005
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that has created, in an organic, informal way, means and mechanisms to
order and sort the myriad authorities available for citation by judges. And,
just as important, it comes to our judicial system free of the parallel “embeddedness” of the foreign judicial system from which it came. The effect is to
deracinate the judicial texts of other legal systems, to strip them out of the
particular social settings that animate them for our own parochial purposes
even as we grandly declare them to be “global” and “universal” purposes.
In so doing, however, we dishonor them — because we do not think their
particularity, their “embeddedness,” matters, while we certainly think ours
does. We act like the dilettante religious seeker, borrowing a little bit from
this religion and a little from that, a piece of pantheism here, nature worship
there, Jesus hither, the Buddha thence, and then call
shallow mish-mash “global” and “universal”
We all know the
religion.
We all know, in other words, within our informal
the difference
ordering of authority, the difference between citing a
between citing Supreme Court case and a quotation from Bartlett’s
— but as between, for example, the German constia Supreme
tutional court and the high court of India? To go by
the justices’ citations, one wonders whether it is anyCourt case
thing more than just whom they happened to meet
over the years at international judicial conferences
and a
or, perhaps, the foreign languages they happen to
quotation
read and speak. It is not irrelevant that Justice Breyer
cited the high court of Zimbabwe, apparently
from Bartlett’s. once
in order to give it more prestige, through association
with the U.S. Supreme Court, in its own beleaguered
political circumstances. Yet in the American University colloquium, he
allowed that this was a mistake — presumably on the basis of finding out
more about the facts of the regime and perhaps reflecting that, after all, a
high court is still the high court of a state, in this case the vicious Mugabe
dictatorship, even if that court seeks, within its practical bounds, to act well.
The point is that a judge can use any of this material how he or she will.
Which is why Judge Posner, who even within a consequentialist ethic understands the need for constraint, has expressed grave concern at the invitation
to judges to “troll deeply . . . in the world’s corpus juris” to reach a politically preferred outcome.
Finally, it bears noting that the comparativism of Roper, like Lawrence —
both authored by Justice Kennedy — is not founded on pragmatism. To the
extent that the comparativism of either opinion has a coherent foundation,
that foundation is natural law, not pragmatism. It is a confirmation of
Justice Scalia’s view that the leading opinions featuring comparative constitutionalism — those of Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy — are animated
by exactly the judicial philosophies which, with respect to the rhetoric of
judging, are the least constrained. Either the citation of foreign and interna46

Policy Review

Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution
tional legal materials will come to nothing — it will mean nothing — or else,
far more likely, it will open up whole new areas of rhetorical possibility.
How can it be otherwise? There is nothing internal here, whether in principle or in practice, that acts to constrain. Progressivist, internationalist liberals should be very, very careful what they wish for in wishing open the door
to foreign law in the hands of either natural law judges or judicial pragmatists.

Democratic sovereignty

I

n the american university debate, neither Justice Breyer nor
Justice Scalia sought to engage the question of sovereignty, confining
their analyses to philosophies of judging and constitutional interpretation. Nor, for that matter, have other justices commenting on comparative
constitutionalism. This is unsurprising. Putting the matter as an issue of sovereignty raises the stakes enormously.
It may not be immediately obvious why, under Roper, sovereignty is an
issue. If Lincoln famously defined sovereignty as a “political community,
without a political superior,” and if Roper agreed that foreign and international law is not binding precedent, then in what sense is sovereignty offended? How does this practice establish a political superior? The answer is that
the introduction of these materials raises a serious question not about sovereignty as such, but about democratic sovereignty.
Justice Breyer and others on the Court may believe that American constitutionalism is simply part of a larger community of constitutionalism in the
world and that the task of the globalized Court is to draw American constitutional norms into “ever closer union,” as it were, with those of the rest of
the world — “civilized” and “progressive” and “social democratic” Western
Europe in particular. This is a demonstrably false — empirically false —
understanding of the relationship between American democratic constitutionalism and that of much of the rest of the world, as Jed Rubenfeld has
pointed out in several brilliant, blistering articles. The dominant international and, especially, European constitutional tradition contemplates “a constitutional order embodying universal principles that derive their authority
from sources outside national democratic processes and that constrain
national self-government.”13 Of course, as Rubenfeld points out, following
the nationalist disasters of the interwar and Second World War period, much
of Western Europe’s constitutionalism was explicitly about reaching to any
available source of constitutionalism other than national democratic selfgovernment, which, equated with populism, was seen in no small part as a
root evil of war and social strife. It is a tradition deeply fearful of democracy
13Jed Rubenfeld, “The Two World Orders,” Wilson Quarterly (Autumn 2003); see also “Unilateralism
and Constitutionalism,” New York University Law Review 79:6 (December 2004)
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and above all hostile to the concept of popular sovereignty. Indeed, in international constitutionalism, “interpretation by a body of international jurists
is, in principle, not only satisfactory but superior to local interpretation,
which invariably involves constitutional law in partisan and ideological
political disputes.”
The American constitutional tradition could not be more different. It
regards, Rubenfeld says, a nation’s constitution as made
through that nation’s democratic process, because the business of the
constitution is to express the polity’s most basic legal and political commitments. These commitments will include fundamental rights that
majorities are not free to violate, but the countermajoritarian rights are
not therefore counterdemocratic. Rather, they are democratic because
they represent the nation’s self-given law, enacted through a democratic
constitutional politics. . . . American or democratic national constitutionalism . . . regards constitutional law as the embodiment of a particular nation’s democratically self-given legal and political commitments. At
any particular moment, these commitments operate as checks and constraints on national democratic will. But constitutional law is emphatically not antidemocratic. Rather, it aims at democracy over time.

It is, in other words, a vision of democratic constitutional self-government
founded on democracy and popular sovereignty — everything that international constitutionalism and the European tradition most rejects. In the
American tradition, the Constitution owes its legitimacy to the political
community which enacted and sustains it, and not to anything exterior to it.
Those who interpret its constitutional text owe their allegiance to that
democratic, self-governing community. The inevitable result is that if there is
a conflict between fidelity to the inside political community and the desires
of outsiders — as there always will be — judges cannot satisfy the desires of
outsiders, no matter how committed the judges also are to the undeniable
virtues, in their place, of cosmopolitanism, urbanity, comity, globalism, universalism, and so on. Justice Kennedy sought, in Roper, to create a formulation in which that essential contradiction goes away by a little magic incantation, pretending that what fidelity to this political community requires of
its constitutional interpreters and what outsiders desire of them will never be
in irremediable conflict.14
The problem with comparative constitutionalism for democratic constitutional self-government, then, is the provenance of materials used in constitutional interpretation. Provenance matters in constitutional interpretation, at
least if democracy and self-government are important, because though the
content of the material may be, so to speak, intelligent or unintelligent, sen14See Eric D. Harpan, “The Sovereignty Implications of Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions,” White
Paper, Federalist Society, at www.fed-soc.org.
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sible or stupid, prudent or imprudent, it is frankly secondary to the fact that
it gives, even indirectly, the consent of the governed to its use and hence to
the binding conclusions derived. Constitutional interpretation is not merely
a matter of “best policy,” considered in a vacuum, but “best policy” as it has
arisen through democratic processes — which may or may not have been
successful in reaching the best policy. Without fidelity to the principle of
democratic, self-governing provenance over substantive content in the utilization of constitutional adjudicatory materials, a court becomes merely a
purveyor of its own view of best policy. Yet this is not solely an issue of an
unconstrained Court. It is, more importantly, a violation of the compact
between government and governed, free people who choose to give up a
measure of their liberties in return for the benefits of government — a particular pact with a particular community, in which the materials used in the
countermajoritarian act of judging them nonetheless have, in some fashion,
even indirectly, democratic provenance and consent. In this respect, citing a
foreign court will always be different from citing Shakespeare, and it does
not help to say, well, it is not binding precedent. It is the source that is the
problem.
None of this is confined, of course, solely to Supreme Court cases. On the
contrary, there are good reasons to believe that, given the open invitation of
Roper, the practice will rapidly spread throughout the federal courts. Why
shouldn’t it? The use of these materials, Roper assures us, is after all a way of
affirming fidelity to our constitutional traditions. The practice will now
spread like an internet virus across the legal system, under pressure from both
plaintiffs and defendants, liberals and conservatives, activists and those
answering activists. Once one side has deployed them in litigation, the other
side will have to respond to them and, crucially, find something to counterbalance them from the same corpus juris of foreign and international materials.
It will no longer do to say, in other words, you have cited a foreign case,
but I have cited a U.S. domestic case, and that is self-evidently better authority. All that shows, should the judge be so inclined, is evidence of American
parochialism. Roper tells U.S. judges, in effect, that they should strive not to
be the Ugly Judicial American.

“Our” Court?

T

his essay has addressed the use of foreign and international
legal materials in U.S. constitutional adjudication — comparative
constitutionalism — almost entirely from the standpoint of the justification (or not) of the practice. It has addressed comparative constitutionalism as the question of whether or not it can be squared with existing theories of judging, legal interpretation, and political theory.
There is a second fundamental way to approach Roper, however. This is
not as a matter of justification — not as a matter of judicial, legal, or politiJune & July 2005
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cal theory — but instead as sociology, empirical sociology and social theory.
What, in other words, is the causal account of how six members of the
Supreme Court came to embrace the use of these materials, and what does
that account say about the Court, its values, allegiances, and self-conception
for the rest of society and, indeed, the rest of the world? Will it continue to
think of itself as “our” Court? Or will it see itself instead as a court for the
world?
This essay, like the rest of the commentary on comparative constitutionalism, has touched upon the sociology only in passing — only indirectly, in
references to judges as part of a new global elite. Yet in the long run, sociology and social theory might turn out to be more significant than legal or
political theory to an understanding of the Roper doctrine’s origins in the
Supreme Court, what the doctrine means for the Court’s conception of its
own place in the world — and what, in turn, the Court’s new globalized
sense of itself might mean for the democratic political community of the
United States.
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